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REZENSIONEN / COMPTES RENDUS / REVIEWS 
Akṣapāda Pakṣilasvāmin / Gautama Akṣapāda: L’art de conduire la pensée en 
Inde Ancienne. Nyāya-Sūtra de Gautama Akṣapāda et Nyāya-Bhāṣya d’Akṣa-
pāda Pakṣilasvāmin. Édition, traduction et présentation de Michel ANGOT. 
Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2009 (Collection Indika, 2). 896 pp., ISBN-13: 978-2-
251-72051-7. 
1. Angot’s Introduction: 
Some walks through the philosophical woods 
Michel Angot published something long unheard of within the history of scho-
larship on Indian philosophy. In fact, after the time of G. Jhā, hardly anyone 
attempted a complete translation of a master-piece of Indian philosophy such as 
the Nyāyabhāṣya (henceforth NBh). Thus, one cannot but start a review by 
congratulating the author for his courage and for the very fact that he presents to 
the reader the translation of the complete system of Nyāya in its essential funda-
ment, i.e., the Nyāyasūtra (henceforth NS) attributed to Gautama and its earliest 
extant commentary, the NBh attributed to Pakṣilasvāmin / Vātsyāyana.1 
Translating it all has the double advantage of helping the reader to better 
understand Nyāya, and the translator himself to better evaluate the role of each 
part of Nyāya. No big effort is needed to remember instances in which the 
emphasis on just one part of a system has led scholars to misunderstand the 
relationship of that part with the rest and the general purpose of the system itself. 
Beside the translation, the book also includes a very long introductory 
study (242 pp.), which deals not only with Nyāya, but also with very broad 
issues, such as the existence of philosophy in India. Further examples of topics 
touched on in the introduction are: whether there is an “Indian” philosophy 
(pp.26–32, the final view is that “Sanskrit philosophy” would mostly make 
better sense, see below), whether we can possibly use a Western language (and 
1 Angot (possibly inspired by Bronkhorst’s view on the connection of Yogasūtra and Yoga-
bhāṣya?) claims the NS was – prior to the NBh – transmitted in an oral form and only 
acquired its definitive form through the NBh. Both are dated “between the 2nd and the 5th c. 
AD”. 
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its terminology) to translate and understand Sanskrit texts (pp. 33–37), compara-
tivism (pp.46–50), the real purpose of the Mānavadharmaśāstra (p. 59), the 
correct interpretation of the first vārttika on the Aṣṭādhyāyī (p. 66) and so on. 
Reviewing and evaluating the book in a restricted number of pages is, thus, 
extremely complex. I learnt from Raffaele Torella that a review has also the 
purpose to tell somebody whether s/he ought to buy the book or not. In the case 
of Angot’s book, my answer to this question would be: it depends on the reader. 
If s/he wants to take a “walk through the woods” of Indian philosophy, this book 
is excellent. It offers much food for thought, as if one were having dinner with a 
brilliant company. If, by contrast, the reader wants to read a rigorous essay, s/he 
might find Angot’s one disturbing. Part of it is not Angot’s fault but the 
publishing house’s. The book almost lacks margins, so that one is not be able to 
add notes, arrows or the like. Furthermore, it lacks any index and does not have 
a complete table of contents, so that one can only dive into the dense, spaceless 
but high-content introduction and read it all, with no reader-friendly help. 
Similarly, the book is flawed by far too many misprints, also to be charged to the 
publishing house. The reader will automatically emend most of the minor ones, 
but might have more problems when entire syllables are dropped from or added 
to the Sanskrit text (for instance, on p. 224, within the text of the Caraka-
saṃhitā: anupaskṛtatavidyena instead of anupasaṃskṛtavidyena).2 
I learnt from another of my teachers (M.M. Olivetti) that the more one talks 
about something, the less one has said, because the readers’ expectations become 
bigger the more one says. The reader is reminded of this paradox while reading 
Michel Angot’s long and fascinating introduction, which deals with fundamental 
methodological questions. 
Obviously enough, the broader the question and the greater the number of 
broad questions dealt with, the less satisfying the answers. For instance, one is 
disappointed to see that Pollock’s thesis about the “death of Sanskrit” is 
accepted as matter-of-fact, as if no one had ever questioned it (p. 33, fn. 71). 
Conceptually, the present writer is even more puzzled by Angot’s statements 
about the absence of the concept of “possess” (avoir) and “ought” (devoir) not 
just in Sanskrit language, but also in Sanskrit thought (pp. 38–44), especially 
since the accurateness of Angot’s reflection concerning Sanskrit is accompanied 
2 An example of a minor misprint, which is however difficult to emend, is the name of Y. 
Muroya, a member of the Vienna équipe working on the NBh edition, whom Angot thanks 
on the very first page as “Y. Moyura”. 
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by no reflections at all about the French usage of these words. Angot seems to 
use French almost in the same way he reproaches Indians to have used Sanskrit, 
that is, as if it were the “natural language”, the one in comparison to which any 
other might be judged. Thus, since there is a verb “to have” in French and not in 
Sanskrit, Angot discusses the “absence” of the corresponding meaning in San-
skrit (p. 43). He does not discuss its presence in French, nor does he seem to 
admit the possibility that the same content might be expressed by means of two 
different phraseologies. I might be wrong, but I cannot see any conceptual 
difference between the Latin way of expressing possess (mihi est …), the Hindī 
one (mere pās … hai) and the French one (j’ai …). And even if there were one 
(for instance, if the French phraseology would stress one’s agency within a 
possess-relation), French would be part of the question and not a judge aloof of 
it. One might argue, for instance, that French thinkers misconstrue the relation of 
possess as if an agent were implied, although it is quite different from the 
description of an action. Structural linguists do in fact distinguish between the 
“I” in “I cook” (agent), the “I” in “I hear” (experiencer) and the “I” in “I have” 
(theme or patient).  
However, it is noteworthy that Angot himself at another point of his long 
introduction criticises the idea that language determines thought (p. 48) and adds 
the very important caveat that one is never sure that the categories we now 
attribute to a language are the same shared by ancient authors thinking in that 
same language (p. 48, fn.120). He also translates dharma (in Patañjali’s 
Paspaśā) with devoir, which might appear confusing (p. 54). 
Similarly, his apodictic statements about the absence of rhetoric in the 
“Sanskrit world” (p. 49) or about the absence of “historical science and historical 
awareness by the authors of that [=Sanskrit] culture” (“La science historique 
aussi bien que la conscience historique font défaut aux auteurs de cette culture”, 
p. 51) are mitigated by his criticism towards every essentialisation by virtue of 
which one speaks of “India” or “Greece” in general (pp. 47–48), and by his 
mistrust about the application of Western terminology to Sanskrit works (pp. 
34–36). 
Connected with the idea of taking a walk through the woods is Angot’s 
relation to secondary literature. He tends to quote many times a single work 
(e.g., a pdf-document written in 2006 by the historian Dwijendra Narayan Jha in 
the context of the polemics against Hindutva and only available on-line), 
whereas the reader will notice many absences among the references. Angot 
seems to be quoting works he has read and liked, rather than attempting a survey 
of all that is available on a certain topic. 
482 REZENSIONEN / COMPTES RENDUS / REVIEWS 
AS/EA LXVI•2•2012, S. 479–514 
Summing up, Angot’s introduction is intriguing, since it dares to deal with 
general themes and offers audacious solutions to ambitious questions. In many 
cases, the questions are more interesting than the answers and the generalisations 
appear too superficial (are today’s Brahmans really that close to their “prede-
cessors”? Are their “predecessors” a single category, from the 10th c. BC to the 
18th AD? see pp. 54–55) but it remains extremely stimulating, at times even 
through its incompleteness. To go back to the metaphor mentioned above: if one 
has been lucky enough to be invited to dinner by a brilliant thinker and scholar, 
s/he should not expect precise notes, but rather inspiring conversation. 
2. Angot’s approach 
2.1. The scope of comparative philosophy 
As already hinted at, there is very much of interest in Angot’s introductory 
essay, and especially in his way of questioning. Consider the following state-
ment about the fact that comparison is not natural, but intellectually decided 
(“texts and cultures are not comparable, they are compared”): 
Selon nous, la comparaison ne résulte pas d’une vocation naturelle des cultures, des langues, 
des philosophies, etc. mais d’une décision intellectuelle. Les cultures ou les textes ne sont 
pas comparables, mais comparés. (p. 50). 
And why should one intellectually decide to start comparing? Angot is quite 
sceptical. Once one has given Nyāya its legitimate place, s/he should study it 
“just like one studies Artistotle, Descartes or Hegel, for whom nobody would 
think of adopting the perspective of ‘compared philosophy’”: 
Dans notre esprit, il ne s’agit pas d’instaurer une base de discussion pour les philosophes 
modernes: le Nyāya a naturellement sa place dans le domaine de l’esprit et, me semble-t-il, 
il n’y a pas lieu d’instaurer un dialogue qui serait aussi fictif qu’artificiel; le rôle de pontif 
ou de passeur, comme l’entendait B. K. Matilal nous semble inutile. Il demeure bien né-
cessaire de mettre à mal des préventions, de réparer des oublis, etc. à propos des textes et 
des auteurs sanskrits. Mais une fois reconnue la valeur de la philosophie de Nāgārjuna ou de 
Dharmakīrti, il demeure à les étudier de la même façon qu’on étudie Aristote, Descartes ou 
Hegel, pour lesquels il ne vient à l’idée de personne d’adopter l’angle de la ‘philosophie 
comparée’. Cela n’exclut pas de contraster l’usage de tel ou tel concept, de telle ou telle 
méthode (pp. 66–67). 
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Furthermore, Angot also faces the more general issue of the base of comparative 
philosophy, namely the mutual similarity or difference among distinct cultures. 
He opts for radical difference, but refutes the relativism which would follow 
from it. By contrast, he maintains that “the universal constantly appears with the 
contextual, and nobody can put an exact barrier between them”: 
A certains égards, toutes ces doctrines, même quand on les comprends, sont donc 
radicalement différentes. Un tel relativisme généralisé pourrait déboucher sur une étude 
purement historique et pittoresque de ces hommes et de leurs idées […]. En fait, il n’en est 
rien: à chaque pas, l’universel pointe avec le contextuel, sans que l’on puisse exactement 
établir une barrière entre les deux. Universalisme donc où l’on reconnaît un seul espace 
philosophique qu’explorent diverses cultures. Mais il ne débouche pas nécessairement sur 
une synthèse où se perdrait toute contextualité (p. 67). 
2.2. Angot’s view of Indian philosophy 
Apart from the preliminary statement that “Indian” does not make sense, since it 
has no Sanskrit equivalent and runs the risk to evoke a contemporary political 
entity, Angot has a lot to say about the so-called Indian philosophy in general. 
The author maintains, for instance, that Indian philosophers were first of all 
performers, namely that they performed debates. They were not contemplative 
souls, detached from worldly worries, but rather sanguinely engaged in 
confrontations. Confrontation is indeed the standard form of expression in 
Sanskrit, according to Angot. 
Angot then adds, without any apparent explanation, that philosophy after 
the NBh “surrendered to religion”. Abhinavagupta could be a great philosopher, 
but only insofar as he was first of all a theologian, and so on. On the contrary, 
authors until the NBh could doubt everything, including the Veda. They were, 
Angot suggests, like the sophists in Ancient Greece (pp.11–12). 
Again, I am tempted to think that the opposition between philosophy and 
theology is at least worth further questioning; that doubt seems to play a role 
more complex than Angot seems prepared to admit (think of its celebration in 
Jayanta, who is much later than the NBh and who defends the authority of 
Sacred Texts), and that “pure” inquiry is utopian. But Angot’s discussion is 
thought-provoking, it stimulates discussion and it may fertilise Indological 
milieus even through its provocative approach. In this regard, I understand that 
Angot wants to address the wide audience he contributed to create in France, and 
that it is meaningless to try to rescue the Sanskrit heritage while at the same time 
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discarding all languages other than English. Nonetheless, it is a fact that writing 
in French will mean that many of the Anglo-American philosophers Angot 
directly addresses will never read his text. A paradigmatic case is that of Karl 
Potter, against whom Angot contends that Nyāya is not a direct equivalent of 
“Logic”, and that nyāya in NS is not the name of a discipline (pp. 73–74). Angot 
is probably right in the points he makes and certainly right in raising the 
questions. Similarly, Angot is convincing when he argues against B. K. Matilal 
that he has been too much influenced by the classical and post-classical develop-
ments of Nyāya, even while interpreting its earlier phases. 
2.3. Angot on Nyāya 
What does one find specifically on Nyāya in Angot’s introduction? Apart from 
many short remarks throughout the introduction, Angot dedicates many pages to 
the structure of the NS and to the way it deviates from its structure as described 
in the NBh (in many cases, these deviations seem to me less significant than to 
Angot). Next, he discusses rationality and Nyāya, examining the syllogism. He 
also investigates the common pre-history of Nyāya and Āyurveda, with excerpts 
of texts and translations from the Carakasaṃhitā. 
2.4. Purpose of the translation 
As for the purpose of his translation, Angot states that his “purpose is not to 
translate, but to understand and make other people understand texts such as the 
Nyāyasūtra and the Bhāṣya, within the context in which they have been 
composed”: 
Quant à nous, notre but n’est pas de traduire, mais de comprendre et de faire comprendre des 
textes comme les Nyāya-Sūtra et Bhāṣya dans le contexte où ils furent composés. (p.37) 
This means that Angot feels authorized to insert short glosses within the text, if 
they make it clearer (for instance, at the end of NBh on 2.1.49 he adds within the 
translation: “c’est-à-dire elle est une connaissance ultérieure”). 
Personally, I deeply appreciate Angot’s stress on understanding vs. translat-
ing and I appreciate even more his ability to be clear about what he is doing. 
Nonetheless, I would not subscribe to the ambition of understanding a text “in 
the context in which it has been composed”, since I am more interested in the 
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(more realistic) effort of understanding a text’s fortune and tradition. The same 
lack of stress on the historical perspective also irritates me when Angot uses 
sources of very different ages, including contemporary debates, in order to better 
understand the role of debate in ancient India (p. 104), as if nothing substantial 
had happened after the Veda and before Colonialism. This might be legitimate, 
but readers might have expected a more accurate adherence to the historical data, 
given that Angot has convincingly argued that the label “Indian” applied to 
philosophy is historically unwarranted. 
3. Text and translation 
The editor chooses a reader-friendly rendering of the text, with a Devanāgarī 
version of the sūtra, followed by its transcription in Roman alphabet and by a 
transcription which looses all sandhis, separates words and marks all members 
of compounds. The NBh text is only given in the latter version (e.g.: Tac ca 
ātma-ādi ity ātmā vivicyate. Sandhis between e.g. ca-ātmā and ādi-ity, are 
marked with a non-orthodox line, i.e., a curved line under the text). The same 
does not apply for the Sanskrit quotations within the introductory study, which 
are given in Roman alphabet, but without interruption, as if they were in Deva-
nāgarī, e.g. abhyupagamasiddhānto nāma sa yamarthamasiddhamaparīkṣita-
manupdiṣṭamahetukaṃ vā, [sic] (p. 232). 
The translation is accompanied by a dense annotation, which reflects most 
of the positive traits of the introduction. Like the introduction, it is full of in-
sightful remarks and it is not limited to textual-critical notes, nor to precise 
glosses on single terms. Just to mention a single case, while translating NBh on 
1.1.7, Angot does not think he needs to translate the two vyavahāras (which are 
six words apart) in the same way, but he adds a lot of interesting information 
about the proximity of deities, humans and animals in the same passage (p. 286, 
fn. 816) and about several other topics. Part of this additional information seems 
to be only loosely connected with the main topic. NBh ad 1.1.8 distinguishes 
linguistic communication as instrument of knowledge in two sub-types, one re-
garding perceivable things (dṛṣṭa), and the other regarding things that cannot be 
perceived (adṛṣṭa). Angot notes that the distinction might have been influenced 
by Mīmāṃsā and adds: “Une des règles de la Mīmāṃsā est que, si quelque chose 
a une motivation visible, il n’y a pas lieu de lui assigner une motivation in-
visible”. This is probably an instance of the dṛṣṭa-adṛṣṭa distinction, but the 
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reader might be at first puzzled, struggling to find a direct connection with NBh 
ad 1.1.8.  
As usual in Indian commentaries, the annotation decreases after the first 
adhyāyas. This is a pity, since the last adhyāyas, which are dedicated to dia-
lectics, are, as Angot himself remarks in the introduction, less studied, both in 
India and in the West. As for the translation itself, as already pointed out, it aims 
at being comprehensible more than at being accurate. This means that, unlike 
most “Indological” translations, it is readable and often even enjoyable. Due to 
the space limitations of a review and to the ambition of Angot’s translation, I 
will only focus on a few points. In this connection it is worth remembering that 
Angot translated the whole NBh and that, consequently, the vastness of his effort 
largely compensates occasional lapses. 
3.1. NBh on 4.1.37 
Contesting the Buddhist stance on the non-existence of everything, the Naiyā-
yika explains that the Buddhist syllogism is in itself contradictory. Why? “[…] 
car il demeure impossible de penser l’absence en termes de multiplicité et de 
multiplicité” (p. 664). The Sanskrit has anekatā and aśeṣatā. The repetition in 
Angot’s translation is probably just accidental, but the translation thus fails to 
highlight the difference between the two terms. More importantly, the translation 
fails to explain that the contradiction lies exactly in the proximity of “non-
existence” and “totality”. How could the totality of everything be just “non-
existing?” 
3.2. NBh on 5.1.15 
The section discusses doubt (saṃśaya). This is described as due to the fact that a 
certain thing shares similarities with two sets of other things. For instance, in the 
case of sound nityānityasādharmyāt saṃśayaḥ, which Angot translates as: “le 
doute provenant d’une ressemblance avec ce qui est permanent ou imperma-
nent”. Given the ambiguity of the French ou (equivalent to both the Latin aut 
and vel and therefore expressing both an inclusive and an exclusive disjunction), 
the translation is not false, but it fails to underline the resemblance to both 
permanent and impermanent kinds of things. 
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3.3. NBh on 5.2.18 
The section discusses the weak points (nigrahasthāna) through which one is de-
feated in a debate. The whole section is problematic because the list often seems 
to depend more on conventions widespread at the time of the NS than on struc-
tural necessity. Moreover, the NBh’s gloss is often quite short and terms such as 
uttara (reply) and vādin (speaker) might be difficult to interpret: is the vādin 
always the one the NS addresses? Is uttara always his reply to the adversary? 
The only way to make sense of the passage is often to have recourse to a clearer 
commentary, such as those of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa within his Nyāyamañjarī and with-
in his Nyāyakalikā.3 
One of the weak-points is called apratibhā. The term pratibhā has a com-
plex history, and it seems to indicate one’s intuitive power, or one’s ability to 
immediately grasp something. The apratibhā is defined as follows in the NS: 
uttarasyāpratipattir apratibhā. The NBh adds: parapakṣapratiṣedha uttaram. 
tad yadā na pratipadyate, tadā nigṛhīto bhavati. Let me now compare Angot’s 
translation and the one I would suggest: 
L’incapacité à formuler une réponse est l’apratibhā ‘embarras’. 
L’uttara c’est la réfutation du parti adverse; et de fait quand on ne peut la formuler, on est 
vaincu. 
The apratibhā consists in non-understanding the reply. 
The reply is the confutation of the other’s view. When one does not understand it (the reply), 
one has been defeated.  
The main divergence lies in the interpretation of pratipatti/pratipadyate, which 
Angot translates as causatives. Both translations are open to debate, since mine 
favours a less cumbersome understanding of pratipatti/pratipadyate, but in order 
to do that uttara must be taken in a non-technical way, i.e., as a generic reply, 
independently of the one who is uttering it. My translation relies on Jayanta and 
on the fact that he openly refers to the fact that one might miss the sense of the 
uttara. Angot might easily object that Jayanta does not need to be right. 
Moreover, one cannot expect a translator of the whole NBh to read all sub-
commentaries. 
Elisa Freschi 
3 I had the pleasure to read parts of both in Vienna, together with Daniele Cuneo and 
Alessandro Graheli. 
